bresslawcom.gif (1009 bytes)

 


COURT ISSUES WERE WHETHER A SPOUSE MAY BE TREATED OTHER THAN AS A SPOUSE FOR PURPOSES OF GIFTING, WHETHER A LOAN IS ACTUALLY A GIFT, WHETHER GIFTS WERE MADE SOLELY FOR REASONS HAVING NOTHING TO DO WITH MEDICAID ELIGIBILITY, AND WHETHER A FRACTIONAL DISCOUNT SHOULD BE AVAILABLE IN INSTANCES OF FRACTIONAL REALTY TRANSFERS

Click here to save article in WinZip.exe format to your PC 

 

For Medicaid eligibility purposes, gifting of assets could create a period of ineligibility if a spouse is seeking to have Medicaid pay for a form of institutional care, e.g., nursing home care.  In the instant case, the well spouse who was separated from the ill spouse made some gifts and the issue before the court was whether it is appropriate to treat attribute those gifts to the ill spouse and thus impose a period of ineligibility.

 

The spouse issue was resolved by testimony of an ongoing relationship.  The court seemed to leave the door open to a different conclusion in a situation where a married couple separated and had no contact.  Thus there was at least an implicit recognition that a separation with no contact may be sufficient to treat the spouse as if not a spouse for purposes of determining whether a gift by a spouse was made.  The resolution was important because the person in need of the Medicaid was not the gift giver but the spouse of the gift giver.  Gifts by a nonspouse would be irrelevant and not cause a period of ineligibility.

 

The court considered whether another gift was actually a loan.  The record indicated that there was a token repayment, no schedule for repayment and no interest rate.  Thus, it found a gift.  Wouldn’t a loan receivable be treated as a resource in any event?

 

A gift of a 50% interest in a farm was made and the petitioner sought to apply a discount to the value of the gift owing to the fact that the gift constituted a fractional interest in real property.  The appellate court indicated while such a discount may be available for gift and estate tax purposes, no such concept was recognized in the Social Services Law of New York. 

 

For those who are interested the decision may be found at In the Matter of Clifford Campbell, 787 N.Y.S.2d 491; 2005 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 75.

 

 

 

to top of page